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same path to protection of human rights that the Western world followed.
No international law obliged the West to protect human rights during its
own era of economic expansion. Thus, the West could practice slavery,
expel surplus populations, and colonize other parts of the world. Genocide
and ethnic cleaning were not prohibited.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The non-Western world does not enjoy the advantage of human rights
lawlessness. It does, however, enjoy other advantages occasioned by the
presence of human rights. There is a global communications network and
many global pro-human rights organizations. There is also the movement to
global governance. Finally, and paradoxically, there is the global social
movement against globalization, which forces some reflection upon its
deleterious consequences.
Thus, the non-Western world benefits from geographical and chrono-
logical human rights “leapfrogging.” This, along with the social changes that
global capitalism and industrialism may impel, may mean that the medium
and long-term consequences of globalization are positive for human rights.
II. THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION II
Globalization is changing the conditions under which all countries and
societies are integrated into world politics and the world economy. Among
human rights activists and some human rights scholars, there is a debate
about whether globalization is “good” or “bad” for human rights. Peter
Schwab and Adamantia Pollis, for example, focus only on the negative
aspects of globalization, stating “Clearly globalization has had a deleterious
effect on the entire complex of human rights . . . .”1 I suggest that this is a
false debate. The issue is not whether globalization is a “thing” out of
control, eating up traditional societies, local values, and local economies.
This is inevitable. Globalization cannot be stopped, and its forces will
undermine what is left of purely local societies. The issue is the kinds of
changes that globalization is likely to effect in the long as well as in the
medium and short terms, and how societies and individuals will react to
those changes. To argue whether globalization as a process is “good” or
“bad” is as irrelevant as arguing whether the transition from an agrarian to
an industrial society in the Western world from the eighteenth to the
twentieth century was good or bad. Many complex social changes oc-
curred: some economies were strengthened, some were weakened. Some
states rose, some fell. Some social classes and categories benefitted, others
sank into oblivion.
Globalization is not only inevitable; it is, despite all its costs, the only
path to long-term growth. As Amartya Sen has stated, “The one solution [to
1. Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis, Globalization’s Impact on Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW REALITIES 209, 217 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds.,
2000).
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the problems caused by globalization] that is not available is that of
stopping globalization of trade and economies.”2 “The countries that
change the least,” notes The Economist, “where the costs of growth are
closest to zero, are those where poverty and disease are worst.”3 But there
are, nevertheless, many and severe short-term costs on the path to medium
or long-term growth. One solution that may partially alleviate the problems
caused by globalization is the “leapfrogging” of human rights across time
and space, as discussed below. The global human rights regime and the
global human rights process can perhaps remedy some of the dangers of the
global economic system.
Undoubtedly, however, the process of globalization is causing human
rights abuses in the short term, some of them very severe.4 Before presenting
my argument, therefore, I wish to make clear my personal position on the
human rights abuses caused by globalization. I believe that in the short as
well as the medium and long terms every effort ought to be made to ensure
that everyone enjoys her or his full range of human rights, including
economic rights. I do not believe that present generations should be told
that they must suffer, for the sake of future generations. More pragmatically,
I would like to see a world in which every policy change meant to promote
globalization was obliged to adhere to the principle that the poorest not be
rendered even worse off. This would require that states, international
organizations and multinational and national corporations submit all
policies that promote globalization to a “human rights filter” that especially
focuses on economic rights.5 Therefore, I fully support all efforts to protect
individuals from human rights abuses consequent on globalization. I am
particularly concerned that the pace of change be controlled and “shock
treatments” not be imposed by international institutions on societies not
able to absorb the shock. As Sen argues, “In the context of economic
disparities, the appropriate response has to include concerted efforts to
make the form of globalization less destructive of employment and
2. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 240 (1999).
3. Face Value: Why Naomi Klein Needs to Grow Up, ECONOMIST, 9 Nov. 2002, at 70.
4. See Robert McCorquodale & Richard Fairbrother, Globalization and Human Rights, 21
Hum. Rts. Q. 735, 742–50 (1999). See also The Realization of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Globalization and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights,
Preliminary Report submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama, in accor-
dance with Sub-Commission resolution 1999/8, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n. on the
Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Agenda Item 4, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/
13 (2000).
5. For example, such a “filter” is part of the mandate of the Inspection Panel, which
considers the environmental impact of World Bank projects. See Jonathan Fox,
Transnational Civil Society Campaigns and the World Bank Inspection Panel, in
GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 171, 177 (Alison Brysk ed., 2002).
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traditional livelihood, and to achieve gradual transition.”6 The following
analysis is meant to address the possible long-range human rights outcome
of globalization, not to suggest in any way that legal activists, members of
civil society, and others who point out its human rights abuses in the short
term should cease their activities. On the other hand, the following analysis
is meant to persuade readers that in the long run, globalization may well
create a world of increased prosperity, democracy, and protection of human
rights.
Karl Polanyi wrote The Great Transformation to explain the economic,
social, and political changes that occurred in Europe, particularly Britain,
from the end of the eighteenth century to the Second World War.7 This was
a period of about 160 years, known to have radically transformed the way
people lived. Peasants became artisans, industrialists, members of the
proletariat: they migrated from villages to cities; they moved from closed,
church-based societies to open, secular communities. Most important to
Polanyi was the newness of a society based only on gain, and the very rapid
end of the “social,” in which previously mankind had always been
embedded. Market relations took over from the relations of reciprocity and
redistribution which had previously regulated social life. Land had been the
basis not only of peasants’ economic security but also of their feeling of
connection to the places and communities of their birth. It now became a
commodity to be used by landlords as they saw fit, even if such use meant
expulsion of the peasants. A society in which all members had relations of
obligation and reciprocity to all others gave way to one in which individuals
in their different roles were cut off from each other, and related to each other
only within the marketplace.8
What is happening now is the second great transformation. Globaliza-
tion is the final assault of capitalism on all those areas of the globe that
previously escaped it, either because of explicit communist or socialist
politics, because of national policies of protectionism or withdrawal from
the world economy, or because capitalism had no interest in the region as
a source of capital or resources, a source of workers, or a market. All over
what was formally the noncapitalist, or only partly capitalist worlds—what
Immanuel Wallerstein called the peripheral and semi-peripheral parts of the
world9—the social is giving way to the profit motive, as it did in Western
6. SEN, supra note 2, at 240. On shock treatments, see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
7. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME
(1944).
8. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1933).
9. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 199–225 (1974).
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Europe two centuries ago. Those with power over ordinary people no longer
feel any sense of obligation to them. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it, the
multinational corporations that are symbols of globalization are the new
absentee landlords, foreign investors without obligation to their local
employees or their local suppliers, and certainly without obligations to the
local communities in which they make investments.10 There is, he says, a
“disconnection of power from obligations”: the investors enjoy “freedom
from the duty to contribute to daily life and the perpetuation of the
community.”11 In former times in the West and in local, peasant, pre-
industrial societies elsewhere during the present era, landlords and notables
sometimes ensured that minimum economic security was provided for all,
by controlling distribution of land and by storing food in anticipation of
shortages. This security is now long gone. Likewise, in the former Commu-
nist world, policies that protected the minimum needs of “the people” to
housing, food, and health-care are giving way to policies that deny
economic rights.12 These policies make economic security dependent on
individuals’ and families’ capacities to find scarce employment, obtain
insecure property rights, or invest in erratic and incalculable international
capital markets. In much of the former “Third World” the social—as
characterized by kin-based village societies and by personalized kadi-based
systems of justice—is also giving way to urbanization and the rules of
authoritarian bureaucracies.13 The protections of belonging, however mate-
rially poor the community to which you belong, are giving way to urban
anomie, the feeling that no one cares, no one is there to help, no one knows
who you are. The place of one’s origin—both the physical location and
one’s place in the status hierarchy—is no longer the place where one can
rely on communal assistance. In the former “second” (communist) and
“third” worlds, billions of people are experiencing what Polanyi called an
“avalanche of social dislocation.”14
10. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES 9 (1998).
11. Id.
12. Protection of these economic rights was, however, always dependent on political
conformity and the capacity to escape the auto-genocidal policies of communist
dictatorships. On the 100 million people killed by their own governments in the Soviet
Union, China, and other communist countries, see STEPHANE COURTOIS ET AL., THE BLACK
BOOK OF COMMUNISM: CRIMES, TERROR, REPRESSION 4 (Mark Kramer ed., Jonathan Murphy &
Mark Kramer trans., 1999). Moreover, in the Soviet Union housing and health care were
very poor quality. See NICK EBERSTADT, THE POVERTY OF COMMUNISM (1988).
13. Max Weber used the term “kadi” to describe informal systems of justice in which
individuals approached local notables for assistance and justice. Max Weber, Bureau-
cracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 219–21 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
eds. & trans., 1946). This type of justice persists in countries such as Saudi Arabia and
Afghanistan, in which princes or warlords periodically make themselves available to
ordinary people who are experiencing difficulties.
14. POLANYI, supra note 7, at 40.
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Globalization is defined by Malcolm Waters as “[a] social process in
which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements
recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are
receding.”15 In agreement with Waters, Bauman argues that the present era
is, in effect, the “end of geography.”16 Held, McGrew, and their colleagues
offer a similar definition: globalization is “a process (or set of processes) that
embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and
transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and net-
works of activity, interaction, and power.”17 These authors are correct to
draw attention to social and cultural arrangements. The information explo-
sion, the world-wide reach of mass media, and ease of communications
certainly do affect cultures. Similarly, ease of travel, migration, and
circulation among ancestral and new homes change social arrangements.
Nevertheless, the chief impetus and beneficiary of globalization is capital-
ism. Capitalist production is expanding throughout the world: as Michael
Hardt puts it, “capital in some sense mediates all forms of production.”18
Capitalism is the economic system behind new technologies of information
and communication, behind unprecedentedly large and quick capital flows,
and behind the capacity of transnational corporations to spread all over the
world. George Soros makes this point in his own definition of globalization
as “the free movement of capital and the increasing domination of national
economies by global financial markets and multinational corporations.”19 In
1997 Jeffrey Sachs pointed out that whereas twenty years earlier, only about
20 percent of the world’s population had been living under capitalism (the
rest living either under command socialism or in countries attempting to
combine capitalism and socialism), by the time he wrote the percentage had
increased to 90.20 As societies hitherto outside the capitalist fold adopt a
capitalist mode of production, many social changes occur.
Anthony Giddens quotes Archbishop Wulfstan, who in a sermon in the
English city of York in 1014 said “The world is in a rush, and is getting close
to its end.”21 This is the reaction of many people to the current era: as
15. MALCOLM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION 3 (1995).
16. BAUMAN, supra note 10, at 12.
17. David Held & Anthony McGrew, with David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton, Globaliza-
tion, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 483, 483 (1999).
18. Michael Hardt, Globalization and Democracy, Institute on Globalization and the
Human Condition, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, Working Paper
Series, GHC 01/1, 2 (2001), available at www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~global/wps/
hardtfinal.PDF.
19. GEORGE SOROS, GEORGE SOROS ON GLOBALIZATION 1 (2002), quoting Jedediah Purdy, The
Values of the Market: Stiglitz and Soros, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 143, 143 (2002).
20. Jeffrey Sachs, New Members Please Apply, TIME, 7 July 1997, at 11–12, cited in RICHARD
FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 141 (1999).
21. ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING OUR LIVES 1 (2003).
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Bauman puts it, globalization is a sense of “things getting out of hand.”22
Integration of the “rest” of the world—Asia, Africa, and Central and Latin
America—into the global economy has been occurring at least since WWII,
and has been dramatically speeded up by globalization. Russia and the ex-
Soviet “transitional” societies are also now being integrated into the world
economy, several decades later than would have happened had they moved
from peasant to capitalist modes of production in the early twentieth
century. The leaders of China in 1979 decided to adopt a controlled
capitalism. All these societies want to catch up for lost time. They hope that
by joining the world capitalist economy, their own standards of living and
political and social arrangements will improve.
These manifold changes impel a human rights debate. Will globaliza-
tion improve or undermine individuals’ access to economic benefits? Will it
improve or undermine the state of civil and political rights? There is no
necessary connection between globalization and improved conditions, nor
between globalization and deteriorating conditions. To understand the
second Great Transformation, we must look at the interactions among
economic and social change, political organization, and social movements.
III. TIME FRAMES
Investments by transnational corporations are frequently used in the
political debate as a proxy for globalization. Thus, McCorquodale and
Fairbrother argue that “The apparent universal market and demand for a
product which is . . . produced by a transnational corporation, could be
seen as a manifestation of new opportunities provided by globalization,”
but they then caution that “the impacts of the universal market . . . could
indicate the dangers in this process of globalization.”23 Opponents to
globalization realize that the world-wide integration of the economic
system is its defining characteristic.
In 1996 and 1999, Human Rights Quarterly published a debate about
the relationship between globalization and human rights. The relevant
variables in this debate were foreign investment by multinational corpora-
tions (representing globalization) and civil and political rights (representing
human rights). William H. Meyer investigated two contrasting theses.24 The
22. BAUMAN, supra note 10, at 59.
23. McCorquodale & Fairbrother, supra note 4, at 735.
24. See William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis,
18 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1996); see also Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corporation
and the Law of Uneven Development, in INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF “DEVELOPING
SOCIETIES” 128 (Hamza Alavi & Teodor Shanin eds., 1982).
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first thesis, as exemplified by the early work of Daniel Lerner, was that
multinational investment is an “engine of development.”25 It promotes
economic rights through investment and job creation, and civil and political
rights through the creation of a stable and tolerant environment. The second
thesis was that multinational investment causes underdevelopment. Meyer
referred to this proposition as the Stephen Hymer thesis. The “Hymer thesis”
refers to an article that was very influential among adherents of the Marxist
and dependency schools of thought in the 1970s. Hymer argued that foreign
investment undermines national development and—by extrapolation—
subsequent improvements in human rights.26 Meyer used quantitative data
about fifty-two countries in 1985 and twenty-nine countries in 1990 to
investigate the relationship between TNC investment and human rights,
assuming “a time lag of roughly two to three years between the determi-
nants and the level of human rights.”27 He compared levels of direct US
foreign investment and foreign aid to levels of civil liberties and political
rights in recipient countries, as ranked by Freedom House, and to quality of
life indicators, namely the adult illiteracy rate, the infant mortality rate, and
life expectancy at age one. Over this very short time period, he argued,
there was an improvement in human rights in countries receiving significant
foreign investment. “[T]he presence of multinational corporations . . . [was]
positively associated with political rights and civil liberties as well as with
economic and social rights in the third world.”28 This, he said, confirmed
the thesis that multinational investment was an engine of development.29 He
did not, however, propose why this might have occurred. Nor did Meyer
attempt an explanation in a later volume. He noted only “We need to be
clear on the good done by MNCs, as well as the bad . . . .”30
Meyer very generously gave a colleague, Jackie Smith, access to his
data. She then re-analyzed it, comparing it with her own study. Rather than
rely on data about civil and political liberties from Freedom House, which
some critics consider to be biased against communist countries, Smith
chose data from Amnesty International and the US State Department. She
also used World Bank data on direct foreign investment from all countries,
not only from the United States. Smith found that foreign investment did not
promote civil and political rights. Rather, Smith concluded that there was
“little relationship between DFI [direct foreign investment] and political and
25. See DANIEL LERNER, THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: MODERNIZING THE MIDDLE EAST (1958).
26. See Hymer, supra note 24.
27. Meyer, supra note 24, at 390.
28. Id. at 368.
29. Id. at 397.
30. WILLIAM H. MEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, FOREIGN AID, AND REPRESSION 213 (1998).
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civil rights practices. . . . The factors that seem to have a much stronger and
consistent impact on a government’s human rights practices relate to more
general structural factors, namely GNP per capita and levels of public
debt.”31 In response, Meyer argued that different data could generate
different results and that “at the level of aggregate cross-national studies, the
empirical evidence linking MNCs [multinational corporations] to human
rights is mixed.”32 Moreover, he noted, the aggregate level of analysis
implied by statistical correlations simply could not be transferred to the
level of analysis of the individual case: Smith and her colleagues had
referred to several cases, such as investment by Shell Oil in Nigeria’s
Ogoniland, to point out the intuitive unreliability of Meyer’s original
thesis.33
In this debate, Meyer and Smith both relied on the assumption that a
relationship between globalization and human rights could be determined
by data spanning a very few years. Without implying disrespect for the
important and instructive quantitative evidence generated by these scholars,
I want to argue that the ultimate relationship between globalization and
human rights cannot be predicted over such a short time span. The first
Great Transformation lasted about 200 years. The ancestors of Westerners
who presently live in comparative prosperity suffered many a bumpy road
between their peasant past and their urban present, even among those who
were fortunate enough never to know along the way war, genocide, or other
such drastic misfortunes. The consequences for human rights of enormous
social upheaval cannot be determined in the short run.
Better, then, to look to the medium to long term to try to ascertain the
effects of globalization on human rights. The long term is too long for
adequate academic prediction; it is a century or two into the future. The
medium term might be more reachable. It permits us to look back to the
more recent past to analyze social, political, and economic changes that
have occurred as a result of what we now call globalization. South Korea
provides a model of almost complete transition from a peasant to an urban
society, from a dictatorship to a democracy, over a period of fifty years.34
China shows the very rapid transition from a collectivist, command
economy to an individualist, entrepreneurial economy within the space of
twenty years (since the turn to regulated capitalism in 1979), yet with a
31. Jackie Smith, Melissa Bolyard & Anna Ippolito, Human Rights and the Global Economy:
A Response to Meyer, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 207, 218 (1999).
32. William H. Meyer, Confirming, Infirming, and “Falsifying” Theories of Human Rights:
Reflections on Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito through the Lens of Lakatos, 21 HUM. RTS. Q.
207, 222 (1999).
33. Smith et al., supra note 31, at 208.
34. For an analysis of the South Korean case, see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 170–78 (1989).
2005 The Second Great Transformation 11
party-bureaucratic dictatorship still in place. In former Eastern Europe and
the Russian Empire, there are multiple examples of greater and lesser
success in integrating into the world capitalist system and in adopting
democracy since 1989.
Democracy here stands as a substitute for human rights. Both Jack
Donnelly and Michael Freeman have warned that political democracy does
not necessarily imply protection of human rights.35 Democratic rule can
result in majoritarian rule, undermining the rights of minorities or of racially
distinct groups, as in the all-white “democracy” of South Africa during the
apartheid era or as in Israel at present. Majoritarian democracy can also
undermine the rights of women, as in a Bahamian referendum in 2002 in
which voters decided against granting children born of Bahamian mothers
and foreign fathers the same citizenship rights as children born of Bahamian
fathers and foreign mothers.36 Nevertheless, modern democratic states
buttressed by the rule of law and by a civic culture of activism and political
freedom are more likely than any other type of political system to protect
human rights. And this is precisely the point. Democratic principles of
government, the rule of law, and a civic culture took centuries to emerge in
Western Europe and North America, with intervening episodes of dictator-
ship and fascism. Until well into the twentieth century, what are now known
as human rights were systematically denied to the vast majority of
Westerners. Rights-based liberal democratic societies certainly did not
emerge through some easy, predictable, and inevitable coincidence of
capitalism and rights.
A perfectly detached social scientist might argue that there is no need to
look to either the short or the medium term to ascertain the relationship
between globalization and human rights. The eventual outcome of the
Industrial Revolution could certainly not have been predicted in Europe in
1780: so too the outcome of globalization cannot be predicted anywhere in
the world in the early twenty-first century. But such a social scientist would
not have taken account of globalization’s capacity to “speed up the
world.”37 Economic policies change quickly with international institutions
such as the World Bank to guide the changes and foreign consultants
available to teach the rules and practices of capitalism to willing policy
makers and entrepreneurs.38 Political changes are guided by constitutional
35. See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Democracy, and Development, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 608
(1999), See also Michael Freeman, The Perils of Democratization: Nationalism, Markets
and Human Rights, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 33 (2000).
36. CNN.com, World Electionwatch, The Bahamas, 27 Feb. 2002, available at www.cnn.
com/WORLD/election.watch/americas/bahamas.html.
37. Held & McGrew, supra note 17, at 484.
38. The disastrous “shock treatment” transformation of the Soviet Union from communism
to Mafia-style capitalism was a consequence of advice both from the international
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and legal consultants. Social changes are influenced by international and
transnational social movements, which strive to protect and promote
human rights at the very time that powerful political and economic forces
undermine them.
Assuming that the rest of the world may someday be in the same
fortunate position as the West, enjoying a relatively rights-protective society,
it may not be necessary to wait 150 or 200 years to achieve such a happy
state. Medium term analysis does seem possible. Perhaps some of the more
economically successful post-Communist countries, such as Hungary or
Poland, will soon provide evidence of “short” medium-term change, of
fifteen or twenty years. Certainly, in the period of extremely rapid commu-
nications, capital transfers, and even transfers of material goods, the
medium term may turn out to be much shorter than in the past.
Even so, it is unwise to think that the benefits of democracy, the rule of
law, and a human rights culture will normally be reaped in the short or
medium term. In most societies entering the world capitalist economy, there
will be severe social disruption and much exploitation of (newly available)
labor, including, but by no means confined to, female and child labor. In the
1980s, the wages of young women workers in the export-processing zones
of Asia and Latin America were frequently so low that they did not earn
enough to meet their basic needs.39 Nor will such a phenomenon be
confined to “Western” or “Northern” exploitation of the “non-Western” or
“Southern” worlds. Capitalists from the former “Third World” are as capable
as were the early English industrialists of exploiting their own workers, even
to the point of severe personal injury. In some Asian-owned factories in
China in the 1990s, workers were subject to corporal punishments and
often suffered industrial amputations because of nonexistent health and
safety regulations; Taiwanese, Hong Kong, and South Korean capitalists
conspired with the Party-state against Chinese workers.40 Mexican entrepre-
neurs take advantage of their proximity to the United States to employ
women workers in severely abusive conditions, prying into the most
personal biological details of the women’s lives to extract the maximum
amount of profit.41 States and TNCs often collude in denying rights to their
citizens.
financial organizations and from independent—and quite entrepreneurial—consultants.
See STIGLITZ, supra note 6, at 138.
39. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN FIVE COUNTRIES: THE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES, ASIA
PARTNERSHIP FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 76–122 (Dennis Shoesmith ed., 1986).
40. Anita Chan, Labor Standards and Human Rights: Chinese Workers under Market
Socialism, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 886, 893–97 (1998).
41. Kathryn Kopinak, Gender as a Vehicle for the Subordination of Women Maquiladora
Workers in Mexico, 22 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 30, 30 (1995).
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In this respect, Donnelly’s injunction to scholars to view states as
protectors of the human rights of their citizens in the new globalized world,
rather than as violators of their citizens’ rights, seems slightly idealistic.42 It
is true, as Beetham puts it in agreement with Donnelly, that “nation-states
remain for the foreseeable future the necessary instruments for the provision
of security and welfare for their citizens.”43 Although sovereignty may be
eroding as nations sign on to international agreements, international bodies
possess no enforcement powers when it comes to human rights. Neverthe-
less, whether their powers derive from local or from global political and
economic relations, nondemocratic states are run by elites who act in their
own interests. They are no more likely to protect their citizens’ interests
against foreign exploiters than they were to protect them against local
exploiters. Thus also, the recent, romantic stress on the “local” as “the
radical other” opposed to the “global” is far-fetched.44 Without (interna-
tional) standards and practices of human rights, the autonomy of the local
does not protect human rights; it merely protects local elites.
Whether for good or ill in human rights terms, social relations will
change in the new global society. Societies will become more fluid;
individuals will be more mobile, social norms will change, and traditional
roles will give way to new ideas of how to behave. There will be new
relations between the sexes. Persons formerly holding authority will find
they are unheeded, while hitherto disreputable individuals will gain
credence as role models in a new entrepreneurial world. Guns and drugs
will be considered as legitimate objects of exchange, much as they were
during the great European expansionist period of colonization. Some people
will be confused by these changes and long for a simpler time with a stricter
normative order. Among them, some will—and do—fight viciously to retain
the older world from which they are being so abruptly torn. In such
situations of flux, there will be no necessary short or medium-term
correlation between the processes of globalization and the entrenchment of
human rights, either positive or negative. Nor will there necessarily be such
connection in the long term. As is shown below, no simple model of
correlations can predict the human rights future.
42. See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Globalization and the State, in THE ROLE OF THE NATION-
STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
(ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PETER BAEHR) 401 (Monique Castermans-Holleman, Fried Van Hoof &
Jacqueline Smith eds., 1998).
43. David Beetham, Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan Democracy, in RE-IMAGINING
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 58, 65 (Daniele Archibugi, David
Held & Martin Kohler eds., 1998).
44. Arif Dirlik, Place-Based Imagination: Globalism and the Politics of Place, in PLACES AND
POLITICS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 15, 15 (R. Prazniak & Arif Dirlik eds., 2001).
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IV. SIMPLE MODELS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Both proponents and opponents of globalization appear to rely on relatively
simple models of the relationship between the two.
A. Globalization and Human Rights: A Positive Relationship
A simple model of a positive relationship between globalization and human
rights seems to posit the following inevitable relationship.
45. POLANYI, supra note 7 at 29.
46. See Meyer, supra note 24, at 391–97.
FIGURE I (a)
Globalization Causes Human Rights: A Simple Model
globalization ➯ human rights
FIGURE I (b)
Globalization Causes Human Rights: The Simple Model Complicated
globalization ➯ wealth ➯ human rights
This relationship seems to be what much of the positive rhetoric around
globalization refers to. Nothing has to be done by social actors to promote
human rights in societies experiencing globalization: human rights will
“emerge,” as it were, as societies globalize. In his time, Polanyi referred to
a similar “utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-
regulating market system,” in the belief that a free, self-regulated market
would necessarily result in liberal democracy and peace.45 This is a
nonacademic rhetoric, positing that simple contact among societies will
result in a merging of social values, without specifying what kind of contact,
among which social actors, can result in such positive, rights-inducing
changes. There was and is, however, an underlying belief that wealthier
societies are necessarily more likely to protect human rights than poorer
societies.
The thesis that globalization causes human rights via increased wealth
resembles the “engines of development” model discussed by Meyer.46
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Globalization develops an economy: that is, it increases its wealth.
Wealthier societies are more likely to protect human rights than poorer
societies. This is also the model about which Meyer and Smith et al.
debated, using TNC or MNC investment as a proxy for globalization.47
A version of this model is the notion of “trickle-down” wealth creation:
whatever the short-term costs to the poor, in the medium term the wealth
accrued by the rich will trickle down to them. But during the early stages of
urbanization and industrialization in the first Great Transformation in
Western Europe, wealth did not trickle down in a steady fashion. Thus, in
Britain, the Speenhamland laws were introduced in the late eighteenth
century to provide minimum sustenance to the new poor.48 But in 1834, the
Speenhamland Laws were abolished.49 The new poor did not overcome
their miserable situation until they achieved, first, the universal male
franchise and then the right to form trade unions. The period 1834–1895
was one of horrific poverty in the midst of great wealth, the kind of poverty
that preoccupied Marx and Engels and persuaded them of the need for
working men’s associations, if not socialist revolution.50 Minimum welfare
provisions—what we now call economic rights—were not widespread in
Britain until after the Second World War. This suggests the need for a model
of the relationship between globalization and human rights that takes
account of political variables.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 77–85.
49. See generally Fred Block & Margaret Somers, In the Shadow of Speenhamland: Social
Policy and the Old Poor Law, 3 POLITICS & SOCIETY 283 (2003).
50. See FREDERICK ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND (Panther, 1972). See
also KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Penguin, 1967).
FIGURE I (c)
Globalization Causes Human Rights: The Simple Model Further Complicated
globalization ➯ markets ➯ liberal economic order ➯ democracy ➯ human rights
A yet more complicated version of the optimistic logic about the
relationship between globalization and human rights specifies the interven-
ing variables between wealth and human rights. Globalization opens up
markets; markets are the basis of the liberal economic order; the liberal
economic order is the basis of democracy; democracy is the basis of human
rights. Again, however, there is no necessary causation here. Markets can
result in a liberal economic order—or, as proponents of global trade
suggest, a liberal economic order can open up markets. But to enforce their
populations’ acceptance of these markets, states can and do impose
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authoritarian rule. Populations used to having their own internal markets
protected can erupt easily in rebellion when their local markets are taken
over by foreign produce, leaving many local producers unemployed. State
elites who profit from those new markets—or who, against their better
judgment, are forced to acquiesce to outside market pressures—may well
respond with force.
B. Globalization and Human Rights: A Negative Relationship
It is because of the complicated and highly political nature of the
relationship between globalization and human rights that the anti-globaliza-
tion social movement has emerged. The anti-globalization movement posits
an opposite model of the relationship between globalization and human
rights. In simplest terms, it is axiomatic to many of its opponents that
globalization undermines human rights. Thus Figure II below investigates
models of a negative relationship between globalization and human rights.
51. Joe Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, “The Personal is Political,” or Why Women’s
Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism, 17
HUM. RTS. Q. 691, 727 (1995).
52. GIDDENS, supra note 21, at 16. The term “global village” is from MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE
GUTENBURG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF TYPOGRAPHIC MAN 31 (1962).
53. Face Value, supra note 3, at 70.
FIGURE II (a)
Globalization Undermines Human Rights: The Simple Model
globalization ➯ rightlessness
Globalization, in this model, can have only negative social, political,
and economic effects. People are more likely to enjoy their human rights if
they live in a locally, rather than globally-controlled environment. To use a
phrase coined by J. Oloka-Onyango and Sylvia Tamale, globalization is
“survival of the meanest[.]”51 Put another way, says Anthony Giddens, this
view of globalization would argue that it results not in a global village but
in global pillage.52 This is how the Economist accuses the Canadian anti-
globalization crusader, Naomi Klein, of seeing the world.53 In this view,
globalization is a zero-sum game, which human actors, namely Western
capitalists and Western political leaders, have invented for their own
benefit. These actors use international organizations such as the World
Trade Organization as agencies of “unofficial global government enforcing
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a corporate agenda” on states and citizens who cannot defend themselves
against economic attack.54 Thus the “local,” the concrete, physical place of
human happiness and economic security, must be defended against the
ethereal space of uncontrollable global change.55
54. Bruce Grierson, Kalle Lasn & James MacKinnon, WTO Seattle 99 (anti-globalization
demonstrations), 28 ADBUSTERS 64–66 (Dec. 1999–Feb. 2000). See also Ellen Gould,
Canadian Connection in Seattle: WTO ’99, 29 BRIARPATCH 6, 6–10 (2000).
55. See Dirlik, supra note 44.
56. Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 Dec. 1986, G.A. res. 41/128,
adopted 4 Dec. 1986, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, 41st sess., Annex (1986).
FIGURE II (b)
Globalization Undermines Human Rights: The Simple Model Complicated
globalization ➯ de-development ➯ rightlessness
Opponents of globalization insert de-development rather than wealth
as the intervening variable between globalization and human rights. The
concept of development includes the idea that growth must be accompa-
nied by human rights, as the United Nations proposed as long ago as 1986
in its Declaration on the Right to Development. This Declaration defines
development as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to
and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which
all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”56 This
definition of development implies equitable distribution of wealth, ecologi-
cally sound investment (sustainable development), and nonexploitive social
relationships, such as co-operative rather than profit-oriented production.
The United Nations definition of development is logically redundant,
and moreover is superfluous, diverting attention from the much more
powerful and concrete earlier (1966) Covenants on Civil and Political, and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Nevertheless, the Declaration serves
as a powerful rallying cry for individuals and peoples (including the
“South”) to oppose the disruptive forces of globalization. Its opponents
assume that by its very nature globalization will undermine development,
not promote it. In this view, equitable distribution of wealth, sustainable
development, and nonexploitive social relationships are irrelevant to the
process by which international (especially American) capitalism make
profits. Globalization’s enemies assume that without their opposition, the
social changes and political processes induced by globalization will be
such as to further the interests of the already rich and powerful.
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Opponents of globalization focus on the detrimental short and medium-
term consequences of the spread of capitalism for many hundreds of
millions of people. Although capitalism is the only known mode of pro-
duction that results in a significant increase in the wealth of a society, such
an increase does not in and of itself imply more equitable distribution of
resources, nor does it imply that social interactions will be nonexploitive.
Usually, but not always, early capitalism implies the opposite. Moreover,
the new form of capitalism of the late twentieth-century, focusing on finance
capital rather than on industrial investment, seems to have radically
increased the level of inequality in the world. In 1999 the United Nations
reported that the richest 20 percent of the world controlled 86 percent of the
world’s gross domestic product, while the poorest 20 percent controlled
only 1 percent.57 In 1988 the income ratio of the world’s richest 5 percent to
the world’s poorest 5 percent was 78:1: by 1993 it had widened to 114:1.58
And it appears that globalization is forcing onto an unwilling world the
conditions of early Western European capitalism, ignoring the international
human rights laws that now prohibit those conditions. According to Richard
Falk, neo-liberal capitalism is characterized by “liberalization, privatization,
minimizing economic regulation, rolling back welfare, reducing expendi-
ture on public goods, tightening fiscal discipline, favoring freer flows of
capital, strict controls on organized labor, tax reductions, and unrestricted
currency repatriation.”59 Falk’s description fits the picture of the conditions
often imposed by the International Monetary Fund on borrowing coun-
tries.60 In effect, the IMF imposes these conditions without regard for the
immorality implicit in forcing non-Western, mostly nonwhite human beings
of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to live in conditions
known to have been intolerable in the white West two centuries ago.
Moreover, gross material inequalities are more likely to impede than to
facilitate change in the direction of a democratic and rights-protective
57. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999 (1999), cited in Jeff
Madrick, The Charms of Property, 48 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 31 May 2001, at 39.
58. K.S. Jomo, Mondialisation, Inegalite des Revenus et Tendances de la Politique Sociale,
22 LE BULLETIN DE L’INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL 5, 5
(2000).
59. FALK, supra note 20, at 2.
60. STIGLITZ, supra note 6 at 43–52.
FIGURE II (c)
Globalization Undermines Human Rights: The Simple Model Further Complicated
globalization ➯ market economies ➯ liberal economic order ➯
class society (rich vs. poor) ➯ rightlessness
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society. Balanced economic development, accompanied by an attempt to
provide basic economic rights, is more likely to result in simultaneous
increase in protection of civil and political rights.61
Globalization’s opponents do tend to exaggerate its detrimental conse-
quences, however. The spread of capitalism results in uneven social
change. Many millions of individuals benefit from new job opportunities,
new markets, and a new capacity for mobility, whether from the village to
the town or from China to the United States. Giddens claims that between
1980 and 1994 “[t]he global labor force grew by some 630 million between
1980 and 1994, far outstripping population growth.”62 The eventual
outcome of globalization even for the poorest society is not necessarily
negative, even in the short term. Social activists who oppose or try to stem
globalization fight a rear-guard action that if successful could deprive
hundreds of millions of poor people of new and profitable economic
opportunities. But these opportunities would not necessarily mean that
these poorer societies would become more rights-protective.
How then, does a society change from a global system of capitalism
that results in deep inequalities and social exploitation, to a system that
promotes relatively equal social relationships and relatively equal distribu-
tion of wealth? The first answer to this question is that such a change is not
inevitable. If it does occur, it will occur because of multiple changes—some
economic, some political or legal, some social—that may result from
globalization. Below, I suggest a model of such social change, adopting as
my starting point the same starting point as both Meyer and Smith; namely,
multinational investment.
V. COMPLEX MODELS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In the models presented below, I follow Meyer and Smith in using
investment by transnational corporations [TNCs] as a proxy for economic
globalization. I first propose a “positive” model of how globalization might
result in economic development and better protection of both civil/political
and economic rights. I then follow this with a “negative” model of how
globalization might result in de-development, and lesser protection of
human rights. Adopting the proxy of TNC investment generates complex
models, and there is no suggestion in either of the two models below of any
61. ZEHRA F. ARAT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 103 (1991).
62. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRITICS 125 (2000). Giddens cites no source for
these figures, however.
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inevitable relationships. Nor are these models complete pictures. But they
do show, at the least, how very complex and contingent is the transition to
a rights-protective society.
A. The Optimistic Model
Figure III (a) starts with one, and only one, change introduced into a society:
namely, transnational investment. It assumes a society that is not democratic
and does not respect human rights, but that does permit foreign investment.
Into such a society, transnational investment impels some changes. These
changes are along the lines proposed by the “engine of development”
school analyzed by Meyer.63 This school asserts that TNCs create jobs,
provide employee benefits, and help create a middle class. However, my
analysis assumes that these changes are neither linear nor inevitable. All
rights, and most especially the socioeconomic rights represented by em-
ployee benefits, depend upon social movements and political action.
Whatever a theoretical model might suggest about the positive effect of
globalization on economic rights, only concrete social action will bring
about these benefits. Nevertheless, it is worth constructing a theoretical
model of how this might occur.
On the economic front, the most obvious change in a society newly
encountering transnational investment is the provision of new employment
opportunities. A small and growing group of people now works in the
modern, industrial sector. Some of these people will pay taxes to the
government, as will the transnational corporation itself (unless it is allowed
a complete tax holiday in perpetuity.) Increased national revenue appears to
be associated with improvement in human rights.64 One can posit a number
of reasons why this might be so. Increased national revenue results in a
small increment in governmental capacity: with more tax revenue, the
government can pay its civil servants more regularly. Such pay gives civil
servants an incentive to stay in their offices and abide by bureaucratic rules
of fairness and impartiality, rather than wander off to eke out a living in the
informal sector, or ask for bribes every time they encounter a citizen with a
request. New economic opportunities will also lessen the likelihood that
moves toward political democracy will be resisted. Holders of both political
and bureaucratic office will be less frightened by the possibility of losing
that office if they can assume that they can maintain their standard of living
63. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs, supra note 24, at 376–77.
64. See Kathleen Pritchard, Human Rights and Development: Theory and Data, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL VIEWS 329 (David P. Forsythe ed., 1989).
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in the private sector. One of the chief causes of political corruption among
high-level office-holders, the fact that there are few economic opportunities
in the capitalist, legal, and professional sectors to serve as alternate sources
of income, will be reduced.
TNC investment will also contribute to the establishment of the rule of
law. Investors want predictable laws and competent judicial systems to
FIGURE III (a)
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enforce their contracts and their property rights. They do not want
governments that renege on their contracts, as China is wont to do, or that
are too weak to enforce property laws, as was the case in early post-
Communist Russia. The rule of law also provides the opportunity to legally
own property, and to have one’s property protected by the state. The
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has argued that one of the biggest
stumbling blocks to development in Latin America, Asia, and Africa today is
that the poor are not legal owners of their houses, land, and mini-
enterprises. Without legal title, they are at the mercy of corrupt bureaucrats
who demand bribes not to evict them from their homes and businesses.
Further, without evidence of legally-enforced property, they have no
collateral to offer banks for loans. And they cannot enjoy economies of
scale, because they often have to disperse their enterprises among many
different locations to prevent seizure of their illegal assets.65
The spread of property law will assist in the regulation of citizens’
myriad private interests. Some of these citizens will be members of the new
middle or entrepreneurial class. TNC investment will result in more local
business opportunities, either directly in relationship with the TNCs by, for
example, supplying locally-made inputs, or indirectly by providing goods
and services for workers who have established new communities in the
areas of TNC investment. This new middle class will want its own property
protected and its contracts enforced.
The new middle class may emerge from the ranks of those who are
already educated, as have Chinese entrepreneurs from a socialist society
that stressed education.66 But this class will also want even more education.
It will want its sons, and even its daughters, to be educated so that they can
join their parents in business and later manage the property they inherit. It
may also want a more educated population in general, so that it can employ
individuals with the skills it needs. Here, the TNC may eventually join in a
demand for more education, or provide its own educational system, if it
discovers it needs a more literate or numerate labor force.
As the new middle class becomes more aware of its own interests, it
will become less willing to live under the rule of traditional elders,
communist bureaucracies, or personalist dictators. It will establish the
rudiments of a civil society, organizing to protect its own interests. This civil
society will in turn feed back into the educational system, asking that new
ideas of the proper relationship of citizen to ruler be promulgated. It will
65. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, Twenty-First Morgenthau Memorial Lecture
on Ethics and Foreign policy, New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and World Affairs,
available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/845_inprint9.pdf (2002). See also Madrick,
supra note 57.
66. SEN, supra note 2, at 42.
2005 The Second Great Transformation 23
promote ideals of social equality, so as to enhance its own chances of
advancement, regardless of the former or present social statuses of its
members. It will also enhance governmental capacity, demanding fairness
and efficiency, and displaying some willingness to pay taxes in order to
obtain them. A more secure bureaucracy will be more willing to listen to the
concerns of its citizenry and to respond to them. As it does so, it will learn
that it is possible to make changes in policy, even to disburse more funds,
without losing control of the state. It will be easier to adhere to the
principles of accountability and transparency, key aspects of good gover-
nance, in state institutions that are properly funded and in which bureau-
crats are well-trained and adequately paid.
An emergent civil society will also begin to demand a more liberalized
political sphere. Citizens will start to make their interests known, and will
expect their government to take these interests into account. Citizens will
want the rule of law to cover areas of life beyond property and contract:
they will demand regularity, fairness, and predictability in other spheres of
life. A government less reliant than previously on corruption, and more used
to bureaucratic procedure, will be more willing to entertain the possibility
of liberalizing, gradually opening up to freedoms of speech, press, and
association that permit citizens to articulate their wishes.
A more humanistic ideology develops along with—and in part as a
cause of—the more liberalized political sphere. As the market spreads and
impersonal market relations become more common, commerce begins to
take precedence over prejudice. Strangers become individuals with whom
transactions are made, rather than bearers of particular identities. A
universal moral sense develops. Indeed, Gary Madison goes so far as to
argue that the market breeds civility: all parties must communicate with
each other in a tolerant fashion, and all must be willing to compromise if
exchanges are to take place. The economic agora contributes to the political
agora, and market trust helps to build the social trust necessary for a
functioning political democracy.67 Furthermore, as market relations and
contract law impose on individuals a culture of promises, they begin to
think of their obligations to distant others in these terms.68 Old status
distinctions are eroded, and political relations develop among individuals of
radically different statuses, as, indeed, occurred in a much earlier period of
globalization in the eighteenth century, as Europe began to expand its
relations with the entire world.69
67. G.B. MADISON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153 (1998).
68. Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2,
90 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REV. 547, 551 (1985).
69. Emma Rothschild, Globalization and the Return of History, 115 FOREIGN POLICY 106, 112
(1999).
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The entrenchment of economic rights for ordinary people will require a
different and expanded set of social actors, especially members of the
working class. People working in the modern, industrialized sector will
soon start to make demands. They will want independent trade unions to
organize and act as their bargaining agents. As they attain small incremental
improvements in working conditions, so they will be emboldened to ask for
more rights, such as better access to education. They will also learn how to
take part in large, bureaucratized organizations and how to lobby and
bargain. As they become more educated and experienced, they will enter
other spheres of civil society, generalizing the idea that social welfare
should be available to all citizens, whatever their particular status as
entrepreneurs or workers. Improvements in education, health, and welfare
in turn will spiral backward, affecting the capacity of citizens to take part in
a political democracy. Both workers and members of the middle class, now
living under the rudiments of the rule of law and the rudiments of political
democracy, will absorb the idea that with rights, they are legally equal
citizens of their country. This idea will spread to groups that hitherto might
have been unsure whether they were equal to others, such as women,
persons occupying lower castes or statuses, or ethnic, religious, or racial
minorities. They in turn will form their own civic associations and learn the
same lobbying and bargaining techniques as other groups in civil society.
The above is not so much a prediction as a rough description of what
happened in Western Europe and in North America during and after the
period of the first Great Transformation. The introduction of capitalism
resulted in the development of social classes capable of articulating their
needs. These social classes used their civil and political rights to articulate
demands for economic rights. Following the example of the labor move-
ment, status-based movements also emerged: in the US, the African-
American movement for civil rights and the women’s and gay and lesbian
movements for equality rights. Both these movements also resulted in
enhanced access to economic rights, although severe inequalities still exist
between whites and blacks, and between men and women, just as there is
still severe income and wealth inequality among the population in general
in developed capitalist Western states.
None of the social changes discussed above was inevitable, however.
Nor did these social changes occur in the West in a linear fashion. They
spiraled back upon themselves again and again. Enhanced governmental
capacity, for example, fed into education, which fed into employment,
which fed into taxes, which fed into enhanced governmental capacity. Even
a spiral does not capture their interrelationships: perhaps several overlap-
ping Mobius strips would be the best visual analogy.
One piece of good news, however, is that almost all countries of the
world now accept capitalism. Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens have
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shown the connection between capitalism and democracy: capitalism is a
necessary, though not sufficient, prerequisite for democracy.70 Both quanti-
tative and qualitative studies finding a correlation between capitalism and
democracy also show that an intervening variable is necessary to effect such
a correlation. That intervening variable is class action and organization. In
a review of many studies of the relationship between economic develop-
ment and human rights, Landman also finds that “economic development
[usually capitalist] does not enhance directly political or civil rights,” but
that “social mobilization has a direct relationship with the expansion and
contraction of political and civil rights.”71
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens’ analysis confirms Sen’s asser-
tion that development depends on human agency: the “achievement of
development is thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people.”72
Participatory freedoms are particularly important, says Sen. “Political
freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to promote
economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health
facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form
of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to
generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities.
Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one another.”73
But the class action and human agency to which Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens refer is not purely voluntarist: it arises only if the
structural conditions are appropriate. Democracy, Rueschemeyer, Stephens,
and Stephens assert, is “above all a matter of power”:74 it is necessary for the
subordinated classes to wrest democracy from the powerful. Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens set themselves the task of determining how, and
under what structural conditions, social movements for democracy arose.
They referred to the many complex sequences—rooted in the actual
historical experiences of various countries—that resulted in subordinate
70. DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, EVELYNE HUBER STEPHENS & JOHN D. STEPHENS, CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMOCRACY 7 (1992).
71. Todd Landman, Comparative Politics and Human Rights, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 918, 920
(2002).
72. SEN, supra note 2, at 4.
73. Id. at 11. The account by Sen, an economist, of the relationship among different kinds
of freedoms confirms the account by Henry Shue, a philosopher, of the relationship
among different kinds of rights and the need for security (freedom of the person) to
supplement subsistence. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (1980). Sen’s account also confirms the account of the present author, a
political sociologist, of the need for civil and political rights to buttress economic rights.
See also Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Prece-
dence over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q.
467 (1983).
74. Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, supra note 70, at 5.
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social classes’ developing the capacity to organize. Class action is made
possible by transformations in social organization, especially by improve-
ments in education and communication, and by urbanization and the
concentration of population. This results in the emergence of civil society as
a counterweight to state power.
Not only is capitalism a necessary prerequisite for democracy: Freeman
argues that it is also “the only economic system . . . so far . . . found to be
compatible with the relatively effective protection of human rights.”75
Negative evidence to support the connections among capitalism, democ-
racy, and human rights is the abysmal state of human rights in countries that
still attempt to organize their economies on bases other than capitalism.
Myanmar and North Korea come to mind, but so also does Cuba, which,
without the support from Russia that it received from the Soviet Union, has
been spiraling downward since 1990. Capitalism does not inevitably result
in democracy—much less human rights—as some of the ideologically-
minded promoters of capitalism seem to believe. But without capitalism,
democracy appears to be impossible, and without democracy, human rights
cannot be protected. Far more than an economic system, capitalism relies
on certain presumptions about the rule of law, and capitalism creates
modern citizens—both bourgeois and worker—who in the medium to long
term demand human rights.
Once again, however, these are not inevitable relationships. Ruesche-
meyer, Stephens, and Stephens make clear that while there can be no
democracy without capitalism, there can certainly be capitalism without
democracy.76 There can be alliances between “old” and “new” elite classes,
as in the alliance between the old landlord class and the new bourgeois
class in much of Latin America until the 1990s. That alliance permitted
industrialization while blocking the peasants and the urban proletariat from
deriving any benefits from the new system of wealth-creation.77 Moreover, a
state elite can command resources such as decision-making power over
investment and tax conditions that make it worthwhile for the international
capitalist class to ally itself with that elite, blocking any changes that the
lower classes might try to demand. Finally, the military can intervene in the
process of capitalist development.
This kind of blockage is even more a prospect in the early 21st century.
The new capitalism of the globalization era is not an exact replica of the
75. Freeman, supra note 35, at 44.
76. See Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, supra note 70, at 7.
77. For the classic work on this type of class alliance in Latin America, see generally ANDRE
GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF CHILE
AND BRAZIL (1967).
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type of capitalism that Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens discuss.78 In
Russia, for example, a “shock treatment” transition to capitalism was
prescribed by American consultants and international financial institutions
before sufficient institutional capacity and respect for the rule of law had
been developed. This resulted in massive corruption, transformation of the
former party-bureaucratic apparat into a speculative property-holding elite,
and deep de-development, as demonstrated by Russia’s steep decline in
population during the 1990s.79 We cannot be sure that the happy model
presented above of the West’s Great Transformation I will be an accurate
representation of the Great Transformation II, the spread of global capitalism
into the farthest reaches of what were once isolated—and sometimes
insulated—communist or peasant societies. Thus, it is necessary to also
consider a pessimistic model of the present transformation.
B. The Pessimistic Model
What happened in the past may not happen in the future. Globalization of
capitalism may not result in globalization of democracy and civil/political
rights, much less globalization of development and economic rights.
Decisions by international organizations that are imposed from above and
that restrict the political dynamic that might otherwise occur between a
state’s government and citizens’ movements, can reduce the likelihood that
human rights—either civil and political, or economic, social, and cultural—
will be attained. Human actions and human decisions will affect any
transformation that occurs in the less wealthy parts of the world, whether
the still underdeveloped sections of the former “Third World,” notably sub-
Saharan Africa, or the “new Europe” (and “new Asia”), those states carved
out from the former Soviet Empire.
A key difference between the earlier development in Western Europe of
capitalist, democratic, and eventually rights-protective societies, and devel-
opment occurring in the twenty-first century, is the role of global financial
institutions in managing investments. Joseph Stiglitz is extremely critical of
International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies regarding investments.80 He is
especially critical of the way the IMF encourages “hot money” investments
all over the world, without regard to national governments’ economic
goals.81 Hot money flows into and out of a developing country at great
78. See Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, supra note 70.
79. STIGLITZ, supra note 6, at 133–65.
80. Id. at 64–67.
81. Id. at 93.
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speed and can destabilize an economy without providing any economic or
human rights benefits. Such hot money amounted in the late 1990s to $1.5
trillion per day.82 Stiglitz has explained not only how this policy contributed
to the South-East Asian economic melt-down of 1997, but also how it has
permanently reduced national income in that region. Without in any way
claiming a knowledge of economics sufficient to verify Stiglitz’s argument, I
attempt below to schematize his chapter on the Asian crisis and to
extrapolate from it to a more general model of how a society that is both
growing economically and becoming more politically open can regress.83
This is a short-to-medium term picture, not a long-term prognosis; indeed,
by 2002 the Asian financial crisis was “receding into the past.”84 Neverthe-
less, it serves to show that the optimistic picture presented above, based
upon a retrospective reading of how Western Europe and North America
developed, is not inevitable. It also serves to show the extreme importance
of democratic opposition to the processes of globalization and the necessity
for the IMF and the World Bank to develop within themselves the policies of
democratic decision-making and public accountability and transparency
that they constantly urge on states.
In the pessimistic model of the Great Transformation II, hot money flows
into a country as a result of IMF pressure to reduce controls on capital
mobility. Hot money looks for quick earnings opportunities on the financial
market, not for longer-term earnings requiring investment in infrastructure or
manufacturing. There is then, for some reason, an economic crisis, and the
hot money flees the country as quickly as it entered. Without capital,
businesses cannot pay their debts, and many of them fail; this causes job
loss. The local middle class is devastated. There are fewer jobs, either within
the foreign investment sector or within the local sector of businesses and
professions geared to servicing foreign-owned businesses and the foreigners
themselves. Moreover, the middle class’s savings are reduced as disinvest-
ment results in lower valuations on locally-owned investments.
As a result of hot money capital flight, government’s tax revenue
declines, and with it overall government capacity. Governments react by
disinvesting in the civil service, thus causing further job loss. Governments
also disinvest in social services, especially in education and health. With
less investment in education and health, the quality of human capital
82. Held & McGrew, supra note 17, at 493.
83. STIGLITZ, supra note 6, 89–132. For reviews of Stiglitz, see Purdy, supra note 19; see also
Benjamin M. Friedman, Globalization: Stiglitz’s Case, 49 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 15 Aug.
2002, at 48–50, 52–53.
84. Friedman, supra note 83, at 52.
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declines, thereby rendering the country less attractive to future investors
who might be looking for workers.85
Whatever democratization and development of civil society might have
previously occurred is also now subject to threat. Society begins to distrust
the rule of law, as it becomes obvious that the law has been used to protect
the interests of the hot money investors. Distrust in the rule of law generates
distrust in government as an institution capable either of ruling or reforming
a disintegrating economy, thus communities and individuals retreat from the
state. Distrust in law and government expands into a generalized social
distrust: far from civilizing social relations, the market separates individuals
from each other and from society. Ethnic and communal groups start to
compete for jobs, business opportunities, and government hand-outs, and
men try to force women back into the home, away from the economic
opportunities that have helped women emancipate themselves from patriar-
chal control. There are food riots and other political manifestations of
extreme social unrest.86 Fundamentalist political parties, or parties advocat-
ing populist/fascist solutions to political crisis, quickly arise, recruiting
especially from among unemployable men.
The result of such economic and social crises is often a reversion from
democracy to autocratic political policies. As they attempt simultaneously
to meet outside economic demands to pay their debts, and to restore civic
order, governments impose controls on civil and political rights and on civil
society. Attempting to attract international hot money and capital back to
the country, they offer a weakened labor force, imposing controls on trade
unions. Less educated than previously and less able to exercise their basic
civil and political rights, workers are less capable of pressuring either
governments or employers for their economic rights, which consequently
decline. “Third generation” rights such as the right to development and the
right to a clean environment also suffer without active labor movements and
civil society organization to pay attention to them.
Stiglitz’s description of the meltdown in Asia refers to the very short
period of 1997–1999.87 The phenomena he describes are the kinds of short
and medium-term problems that preoccupy the anti-globalization forces.
These phenomena reinforce the point made by Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens and others, that class action and organization are necessary
85. Sen stresses the importance of spending on health and education, in order to develop
the human capacity of a nation. See generally SEN, supra note 2.
86. STIGLITZ, supra note 6, at 119–20, discusses how unwilling the IMF has been to realize
that “quick fix” economic policies requiring that governments remove food subsidies
will result in riots and further political destabilization.
87. Id. at 89–132.
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connections between capitalism and democracy.88 Class action and organi-
zation are also necessary to connect capitalism, democracy, and human
rights. As the world globalizes, no positive transformation of the human
rights situation of ordinary people will occur without a social movement for
those rights. This is so even when all economic indicators are positive, and
when the rule of law and democratic rule seem “naturally” to evolve. It is
even more so when economic indicators are negative, and when the rule of
law and democratic politics disappear.
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBALIZATION
Above, I have discussed human rights only as dependent consequences of
globalization. But the principles, laws, and practice of human rights are also
independent variables, affecting both elite implementation of globalization
and social action in favor of, or against, it. A major difference between the
first and second Great Transformations is the existence the second time
around of the international human rights regime, and the international
human rights social movement.
A. Western Capitalist Evolution and the
Absence of Human Rights Law
The happy predictions made above in Figure III (a), schematizing the
optimistic model of the Great Transformation II, rely on similarities to the
social evolution of Western Europe and North America. None of this,
however, suggests an easy or inevitable transition in the “Rest” of the world
from poverty-stricken peasant societies to wealthy industrial societies.
Formerly colonized countries in what used to be called the Third World do
not have access to one of the most important advantages the West had
during its own period of capitalist growth. That advantage was human rights
lawlessness. Neither states nor entrepreneurs had to think about the rights of
their own citizens or workers, or the rights of those inhabiting the worlds
they conquered.
During the West’s period of growth, there was no international law to
prevent the purchase or theft of people. Thus, the West was able to profit
from slavery, as also were those who sold slaves to Westerners. The
enslavement of captured or purchased people was a normal activity of the
88. See generally Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, supra note 70.
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pre-capitalist and early capitalist periods.89 Almost all societies were divided
into social categories, some having more rights, privileges, and prestige than
others. Thus slavery was an essential part of the triangular trade between
Britain, the West Indies, and the Americas, and one of the bases of some
Western prosperity.90
Similarly, during the period of Western expansion there was no
international law prohibiting colonialism.91 Colonial conquest was a “normal”
practice inherited from the ancient world. It permitted stronger militaries
and navies to take over territories previously not part of the world economy,
and permitted the colonists to curtail the economies of the conquered
territories as they saw fit. If the King of Belgium wished to cut off Africans’
hands to prevent them from selling rubber to his competitors, there was
nothing to stop him.92 Nascent entrepreneurial classes in the colonies of the
various European powers soon learned that economic opportunities were
reserved for Europeans alone. As, furthermore, there were no laws prohibit-
ing racial discrimination, European merchants, industrialists and financiers
could happily confine their working relationships to others of “their own
kind.”93
As there were no laws against slavery or colonialism, so also there were
no laws against massive population transfers. During the period of Western
expansion, citizens—if they could be called that—in the Western world had
few rights. Their governments could deport them to the colonies if they
disobeyed the myriad laws that regulated their behavior. Their governments
could also deprive them of the lands they traditionally owned, as in the
conversion of common lands to private property in Scotland and England.94
Even famine was a privilege of the state. The English government deprived
Irish peasants of their means of sustenance during the famine of the 1840s,
“killing a higher proportion of the population than any other famine
anywhere in recorded history.”95
89. Joseph E. Inikori, The Struggle against the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: The Role of the
State, paper presented at Fighting Back: African Strategies against the Slave Trade,
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J., 16–17 Feb. 2001.
90. For a classic (although controversial) statement of this relationship, see ERIC WILLIAMS,
CAPITALISM & SLAVERY (Capricorn Books, 1966).
91. Max du Plessis, Historical Injustice and International Law; An Exploratory Discussion of
Reparation for Slavery, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 624, 657 (2003).
92. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL
AFRICA 165 (1998). Hochschild draws heavily on E.D. MOREL, THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN: THE
WHITE MAN IN AFRICA FROM THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY TO WORLD WAR I 109–26 (Monthly Review
Press, 1969).
93. See generally Max du Plessis, supra note 91.
94. As brilliantly memorialized in KARL MARX, CAPITAL, VOL. I, 717–33.
95. SEN, supra note 2, at 170.
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Finally, in the early modern capitalist world, no international law
prohibited genocide and ethnic cleansing. Although there were some
protests—from Catholic and other missionaries against the treatment of
aboriginal populations in the Americas, for example—by and large colonists
could do as they pleased to wipe out the “primitive” populations occupying
territories that they sought.96 At a time when only a very small percentage of
the population of Western states enjoyed anything resembling human rights,
few worried about the human rights of the inhabitants of the colonies.
Germany committed genocide in South-West Africa with an impunity
broken only by a British inquiry after the former country’s defeat in World
War I.97
Human rights lawlessness, then, gave industrializing Western powers
several privileges that are not enjoyed by industrializing regimes in the early
twenty-first century. These privileges were the use of slavery, colonialism,
expulsions, famine, and genocide as tools to economic growth. States and
ruling classes often prospered under these conditions of lawlessness,
although ordinary people often did not. None of these advantages of human
rights lawlessness, however, assured the prosperity of the Western world,
absent the sorts of social changes diagramed in Figure III. Not all colonial
powers became equally prosperous, as the example of Catholic Spain
illustrates.98 Nor did all slave-trading economies become equally wealthy,
as Portugal demonstrates. Internal changes in habits, laws, entrepreneurial
activities, and relations among social groups were also important determi-
nants of capitalist growth.
Therefore, in a global world now characterized by human rights
constraints, less-developed countries will be at some disadvantage com-
pared to their Western predecessors, in engaging in the capitalist path. On
the other hand, as compared to citizens of the West until well into the
twentieth century, citizens of these less-developed countries are at an
advantage in demanding their rights.
96. See WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492
TO THE PRESENT (1998).
97. Horst Dreschler, The Herero Uprising, excerpted in FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE
HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 231–48 (1990); see also Jon
Bridgman & Leslie J. Worley, Genocide of the Hereros, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS 3, 3–40 (Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons & Israel W.
Charny eds., 1997).
98. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM II: MERCANTILISM AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE
EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY, 1600–1750 179–85 (1980).
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B. Non-Western Capitalism and the Presence of Human Rights
Figure IV shows the many aspects of the global order that now affect the
spread of human rights. To begin with, the entire world is now con-
strained—to a greater or lesser extent—by the international human rights
regime, a set of norms and laws which most countries have formally said
they respect.99 These norms and laws mean newly industrializing countries
are not supposed to engage in the same wealth-creating activities as their
Western predecessors: they are not supposed to engage in slavery, colonial-
ism, genocide, massive population transfers, or deportations of citizens they
do not want. Nor are they supposed to ignore the basic economic needs of
those individuals who by law are their citizens. Thus it is difficult for them
to engage in Marx’s primitive capitalist accumulation—that stage of looting
and plunder that Marx argued constituted the basis for the next, more
productive stage of capitalist growth.100
But what is lost as an advantage of states is gained as an advantage of
citizens. Citizens in places now being reached by globalization do not need
99. For summaries of how this regime works, see JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
51–85 (2d ed., 1998); see also DAVID FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3–
138 (2000); see also GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL
JUSTICE 1–123 (1999).
100. MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 94, at 713–72.
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to wait 150 or 200 years before attaining their rights. Globalization speeds
up their access to the very idea of rights.
Globalization accomplishes this first of all through the evolution of a
global communications network. With the Internet and email, it is easy for
citizens of all nations of the world to acquire information and to communi-
cate with each other instantaneously. Citizens are no longer mere consum-
ers of information: they are generators of knowledge and debaters about
social issues. Human rights abuses are now subject to “cosmopolitan
publicity” in a transnational public sphere.101 Civil society actors have
immediate access to knowledge and immediate capacity to criticize public
policy decisions by local, state, and international agencies. This contributes
to that “communicative interaction” that Habermas says is so important for
true democracy.102
Beetham notes, further, the importance of international civil society to
the promotion of human rights.103 The civil society actors who now
populate global public space possess an “ability to forge links with popular
struggles at the most local level anywhere in the world.”104 Although
themselves a new kind of elite, they link the developed and nondeveloped
parts of the globe, the democracies with authoritarian states, in a discussion
of human rights that only the most draconian restrictions on access to the
international communicative media can control.
This communications network in turn enables the formation of global
social movements in favor of human rights.105 Human rights social move-
ments have benefitted from the ease of travel and communications of the
last thirty years. People living in remote parts of the globe can form alliances
with civil society actors in the developed world, and persuade the mass
media to take up their case, as did Ogoni activists in South-east Nigeria in
the 1990s. This is not, of course, a perfect system. For every successful
international campaign there are others that are not successful; success
often depends on good organization and even on particular incidents, such
as the tragic hanging of the Ogoni leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, in 1995.106
101. James Bohman, International Regimes and Democratic Governance: Political Equality
and Influence in Global Institutions, 75 INT’L AFF. 499, 506 (1999).
102. Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 107 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
103. See Beetham, supra note 43, at 58–70.
104. Id. at 68.
105. See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
106. Clifford Bob, Globalization and the Social Construction of Human Rights Campaigns, in
GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 133, 133–47. On the much-studied
Ogoni movement, see also CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
STRATEGIES AND ROLES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 111–16 (1995); Sigrun I. Skogly,
Complexities in Human Rights Protection: Actors and Rights Involved in the Ogoni
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Nevertheless, as global communication erodes geographical remote-
ness, the universal principle of human rights becomes one upon which local
actors can base their demands for justice. If the capitalist-owned mass
media ignore a particular human right, the technology of global communi-
cations nevertheless allows its pursuit through the formation of independent
media groups, chat rooms, and websites.107
Global consumer campaigns against abusive labor practices such as
employment of child labor have been particularly successful. The Rugmark
campaign, for example, tells consumers whether rugs they have purchased
from Asia are made without child labor, exerting pressure for improved
labor standards in producing countries such as Pakistan and Iran.108 Retail
companies are also susceptible to consumer pressure on human rights
grounds, such as in the case of the Swiss grocery chain, Migros. Migros
inserted a “social clause” in its contract with Del Monte to ensure that
working conditions on Del Monte’s pineapple farms in the Philippines were
above average.109 If, as the shoe company advertises, “On Planet Reebok
there are no boundaries,”110 then one of the advantages of globalization is
the capacity of civil society actors in newly industrializing societies to learn
from civil society actors elsewhere. With regard to the campaign in the
1990s against Nike’s labor policies, Smith et al. were correct to note that “in
the absence of consumer mobilization . . . human rights violations . . .
constitute only minor factors in TNC profit equations . . . .”111 Equally, Meyer
was correct to note the “spotlight phenomenon” of media and NGO
pressures on Reebok to stop buying soccer balls from Pakistani subcontrac-
tors who used child labor.112 The cumulative effect of these campaigns is
strong.
There are now voluntary international codes of conduct for transnational
corporations, evolving in part from the twenty-year long campaign before
the end of apartheid to oblige multinational investors to treat their black
Conflict in Nigeria, 15 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 47, 47–60 (1997); Amos Adeoye Idowu,
Human Rights, Environmental Degradation and Oil Multinational Companies in
Nigeria: the Ogoniland Episode, 17 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 161, 161–84 (1999).
107. On independent media groups, see William Meyer, Global News Flows: Dependency
and Neoimperialism, 22 COMP. POL. STUD. 243 (1989).
108. FORSYTHE, supra note 99, at 207; Raul C. Pangalangan, Sweatshops and International
Labor Standards: Globalizing Markets, Localizing Norms, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 98, 107.
109. Pangalangan, supra note 108, at 108.
110. Cited in BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD VERSUS MCWORLD: HOW GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING
THE WORLD 24 (1995).
111. Smith et al., supra note 31, at 211.
112. Meyer, supra note 32, at 224–25, citing Debora L. Spar, The Spotlight and The Bottom
Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights, 77 FOR. AFF. 7, 8–9 (1998).
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South African workers better.113 There is also a movement among interna-
tional lawyers to bring transnational investors under the constraints of the
international human rights regime.114 The International Labor Organization
has found a new centrality in the elaboration of minimum human rights
standards for transnational corporations, even if it does not yet have the
authority to impose these standards.115 The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development has also elaborated voluntary guidelines for
multinational enterprises, including the right of workers to form trade
unions.116
Giddens notes that civil society organizations such as the environmen-
talist group Greenpeace and the anti-poverty organization Oxfam are
themselves now global institutions.117 The feminist movement is also
international: women from all over the world, from the most remote regions
and least advantaged social groups, can meet to discuss common problems,
as occurred at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993 and at
Beijing in 1995.118 These common topics include defense of women
workers’ rights in countries experiencing rapid transnational investment.
Unlike women in the Western world, women in the newly globalizing
world do not have to wait until men are able to assert their rights and then
follow behind. Assertion of the rights of all social categories, in all social
situations, occurs simultaneously in the world of global communications.
The international human rights movement is also assisted by an
unprecedented level of global governance. Scholars make frequent refer-
ence to states’ voluntary abrogation of (some) sovereignty in favor of
international treaties and regulations. But global governance is not only a
matter of formal institutional development, or proclamation of new treaties
and laws. It is also a matter of new space for citizens’ movements. Rosenau
speaks of international social movements as “well-springs of global gover-
nance.”119 This “noneconomic fabric of ties” among citizens world-wide
113. See Mzamo P. Mangaliso, The Corporate Social Challenge for the Multinational
Corporation, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 491 (1992).
114. Pangalangan, supra note 108, at 98–112. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (DUTCH SECTION) &
PAX CHRISTI INTERNATIONAL, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A REPORT (Utrecht,
Nov. 1998).
115. FORSYTHE, supra note 99, at 202–03.
116. RON BEAN, COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
207 (2d. ed., 1994).
117. GIDDENS, supra note 21, at xxv.
118. See Martha Alter Chen, Engendering World Conferences: The International Women’s
Movement and the UN, in NGOS, THE UN, & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 139, 139–55 (Thomas
G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996); see also Elissavet Stamatopoulou, Women’s
Rights and the United Nations, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 36, 36–48 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
119. James N. Rosenau, Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World, in RE-IMAGINING
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 43, at 28, 42.
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acts as an antisystemic force to which formal authorities must pay atten-
tion.120 Global space is densely populated, and within it there is much
pressure for cosmopolitan democracy.
While it is precipitous to argue that national sovereignty has signifi-
cantly declined as a result of the establishment of international law and the
various regimes that limit most states’ capacity to act unilaterally in the
economic, environmental, or other areas, both the reach and the depth of
international law has been significantly extended. The argument that
economic growth requires a free hand both for capitalists and governments
without regard to political democracy or the rule or law has little credence
in the early twenty-first century.
Thus globalization speeds up the processes not only of capitalist
expansion, but also of resistance to capitalism. Social action promotes
human rights not only in theory, but also in practice.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS LEAPFROGGING
In the game of leapfrog, little children line up in a row, then leap over each
other’s backs, the child at the end starting first. In the human rights world,
rights now leap over much larger obstacles. In the contemporary global
society, oceans are crossed and centuries ignored as all sectors in the world
engage in a giant debate about what human rights are or ought to be, what
people from different parts of the world are entitled to, and who or what
agencies are expected to respect or implement those rights. Over the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Mediterranean and Black Seas, human
rights leap from developed to underdeveloped regions. Over the centuries
of the first Great Transformation, human rights leap to the Second Great
Transformation. And as in the children’s game of leapfrog, the last are often
first. Those most deprived demand to go to the head of the line. They
demand enjoyment of all the rights to which they are told by international
law they are entitled, despite the relative economic underdevelopment and
political and legal backwardness of their own societies. Patience is not
enjoined upon them: they are not told their time will come.
Despite efforts of political and cultural spokespersons of various kinds
to shut down the borders, it is increasingly difficult for those who suffer
human rights abuses not to hear the voices of human rights defenders.
Global solidarity is an important aspect of globalization: in 2000 there were
16,500 trans-border civil society organizations.121 Thus globalization is not
120. Id.
121. JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION 58 (2002).
2005 The Second Great Transformation 39
merely a phenomenon coming from “above” in the form of transnational
organizations and corporations. It is also a phenomenon originating from
below, often in the form of “grass-roots globalization,” local organizations
in the underdeveloped world that can connect via the Internet, email, or jet-
set NGO conferences with international human rights organizations based
in the West.122
Thus, human rights leapfrogging simultaneously promotes rights, but is
itself an aspect of globalization to which many object. Reflecting the
changes that occurred in Polanyi’s Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, human rights are posited upon the basic civil and political rights
that communitarian political systems frequently deny; namely, freedoms of
speech, assembly, press, and association. Human rights are also posited
upon a zone of personal privacy, in family relations, in economic activities,
and in individual decision-making. To some people trying to protect their
own societies, religions, and cultures from the homogenizing tendencies of
globalization, the global norms that human rights activists propose seem
suspiciously like “Western” norms. Some influential individuals in the
developing world consider the human rights movement to be propounding
a “foreign” global normative system that requires social and cultural, as well
as political, legal, and economic change. The charge of cultural imperialism
is frequently heard, and the politics of resentment is manipulated to hold
back the tide of human rights.
Human rights leapfrogging is one positive aspect of globalization, but it
is no guarantee of ultimate global respect for human rights. No social
scientist can predict the future, nor do those anxious to protect their
academic reputations attempt to do so. The fact that over the course of two
centuries the capitalist West gradually became wealthy, relatively free, and
democratic does not mean all other societies will inevitably do likewise.
And the Western world’s many deviations from a steady progress to
protection of human rights are well known.
Nevertheless, globalization has spread the idea of human rights world
wide. It has speeded up social change. Ideas and rules of human rights
leapfrog across oceans and centuries, intersecting with social changes on
the ground. Countries such as Taiwan and South Korea have already
followed paths to become relatively rights-protective societies, similar to the
path outlined above in Figure III (a). They did so in fifty years, not 200. Thus
this model is not confined to the West, despite the West’s obvious initial
advantages in industrializing.
Globalization is, then, a powerful potential tool for promotion of
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human rights worldwide. But whether, in the end, it promotes or hinders
human rights is not something that can be determined by quantitative
studies of the kind undertaken by Meyer and Smith. Nor can it be
determined by adding up the numbers of jobs created and comparing them
with the numbers lost. The long-term time frame of the second Great
Transformation may well be shortened by the technology of globalization
from the 200 years of the first Great Transformation to, perhaps, fifty years.
But the final outcome cannot now be predicted. It is no more sensible to
pass judgment on globalization as an instrument of social change that it
would have been sensible to pass judgment on the Industrial Revolution in
1780 or 1800. Now, as then, the short-term detrimental consequences are
obvious. Now, as then, humanitarians must strive to overcome the harms of
dispossession, underemployment, and poverty. But now, as then, we do not
know the final outcome.
